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dicial error. There an order denying a motion for a new 
trial was vacated on the ground that the judge had misin-
terpreted a waiver filed .in connection with the motion, he 
believing that the waiver was of any error with respect to 
certain jury instructions. In its order vacating its order of 
denial the court recited that the latter order was inadvertent 
"by reason of such neglect, oversight, accident and mistake 
in the reading of the waiver and conclusion as to its effect." 
Obviously the court's error in its conclusion as to the ef-
fect of the waiver or its error in the interpretation thereof 
was judicial. I t exercised its judgment on the issue of how 
the waiver should be construed and its legal effect. But 
where the judgment as signed does not express the actual 
judicial desire or intention of the court at all, but is contrary 
thereto, the signing. of such purported judgment is a clerical 
error r,ather than a judicial one. 
The order is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis,· J., and Traynor, J., 
concurred. 
EDIVIONDS, J., Dissenting.-In failing to perceive that 
the order appealed from was the correction of a judicial error 
and not an alteration made necessary by inadvertence or mis-
prision, the majority opinion, I believe, has departed from 
the well established rule which compels a contrary determina-
tion. A court, so the rule declares, may correct clerical 
errors or mistakes in its records and proceedings because 
such correction does not change a judicial act previously 
done, but is an alteration to make the record speak the 
truth. It may also set aside judgments and orders made 
prematurely, or through inadvertence, as this presents no 
question of judicial review upon the merits. But it has no 
power, once it has made a decision after regular submission 
of the case, to set aside or amend for judicial error, especially 
when the only reason for so doing is that the judge has come 
to a conclusion contrary to that expressed by the earlier adju-
dication. (Stevens v. Superior Oourt, 7 Cal. (2d) 110 [59 
Pac. (2d) 988], and cases cited; Harth v. Ten Eyck, 16 Cal. 
(2d) 829 [108 Pac. (2d) 675], at p. 832.) 
Here the evidence shows without contradiction that the 
trial judge signed the findings of fact' and the judgment after 
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having them under consideration for several weeks. No other 
findings in the case were presented. He had before him 
also a letter of protest from defendant's counsel charging 
that they were, at least in part, "pure bunk." In his order 
he stated that he intended to pronounce judgment in favor 
of the defendants and the decision affirming it is placed, in 
large measure, upon his declaration to that effect. 
The recitals in an order of a trial judge that a judgment 
was signed by him as a result of a clerical error are not con-
clusive upon an appellate court (Estate of Burnett, 11 Cal.· 
(2d) 259 [79 Pac. (2d) 89]; Stevens v. Superior Oourt, 
supra), and in the present case, the record is absolutely de-
void of any evidence to support the statement that a clerical 
error was made. On the contrary, there is ample support 
for the conclusion that any error committed in giving judg-
ment for the plaintiff was· a judicial one and subject to cor-
rection only upon timely motion for a new trial or by appeal. 
Houser, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied January 
15, 1942. Edmonds, J., and Houser, J., voted for a rehearing. 
[L. A. No. 16742. In Bank. Dec. 19, 1941.] 
HARRY G. VAN DENBURGH, as Administrator, etc., 
Appellant, . v. WALTER V. GOODFELLOW et al., 
Respondents. 
[1] Bankruptcy-Composition and Discharge-Debts not Affected 
-Debts not Duly Scheduled.-A debt is not duly scheduled 
and is not released by a discharge in bankruptcy if the 
bankrupt has listed the creditor's address incorrectly. (See 
11 U. S. C. A., § 25 (8).) 
[2] Id.-Composition and Discharge-Debts not Affected-Debts 
not Duly Scheduled-Good Paith.-A debt is not duly sched-
uled and is not released by a discharge in bankruptcy where 
the creditor's address is not correctly given, even though 
McK. Dig. References: [1-3,5-9] Bankruptcy, § 38; [4,10] 
Bankruptcy, § 12; [11] Executions, § 34; [12] Decedents' Estates, 
§ 780. 
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the error may have resulted from reliance upon a blurred 
carbon copy of a complaint served upon the bankrupt. which 
set forth the office address of plaintiff's attorney. Where 
the correct address is easily obtainable, good faith in list-
ing the debt is immaterial. 
[3] Id.-Composition and Discharge-Debts not Affected-Debts 
not Duly Scheduled-Notice to Creditor.-A debt not duly 
scheduled is not discharged in bankruptcy where the creditor 
did not receive notice of the proceeding within the time for 
filing claims, it appearing that the notice mailed was un-
delivered because of an incorrect address. Publication of 
notice of the prOoceedings in a newspaper is not sufficient 
because the statute requires actual notice to be given credi-
tors. 
[4] Id.-Debts-Claims Provable-Time for-Extension.-A bank-
ruptcy referee may in his discretion permit a creditor to file 
a formal complaint after the six-month period has elapsed, 
under the theory that the formal claim is merely an amend-
ment to an informal claim made within the time limit. 
[5] Id.-Composition and Discharge-Debts not Affected-Notice 
to Creditor-Time for.-The notice to a creditor required by 
Bankruptcy Act, § 35, must be given within the six-month 
period allowed by the act for filing of claims. 
[6] Id.-Composition and Discharge-Debts not Affected-Debts 
not Duly Scheduled-Notice to Creditor-Equal Opportunity 
With Creditors.-Under Bankruptcy Act, § 35, the creditor 
must receive notice in time to enable him to take advantage 
of the benefits of the Bankruptcy Law-in time to give him 
an equal opportunity with other creditors. It may not come 
so late as to deprive him of participation in the administra-
tion of the affairs of the estate. 
[7a,7b] Id.-Composition and Discharge-Debts not Affected-
Debts not Duly Scheduled-Voluntary Participation, Effect 
of.-Although the notice to a creditor may have been insuffi-
cient, voluntary participation in the bankruptcy proceeding 
as the result of permission extended to file a claim after the 
expiration of the six-month period, operates to discharge the 
debt owed the creditor by the bankrupt. By electing to file 
a claim, the creditor waives any rights arising from defects 
in the schedule or notice or from any detriment he may suffer 
because of having no opportunity to participate in the ad-
ministration of the estate. 
[8] Id.-Composition and Discharge-Debts not Affected-Debts 
not Duly Scheduled-Notice to Creditor-Reason for Rule. 
[3] See 4 Cal. Jur. 87; 6 Am. Jur. 817. 
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The prOVIsIons requiring either a correct statement of the 
ereditor's address or actual notice to him are intended to in-
sure the creditor an opportunity to participate in the ad-
ministration of the bankrupt's estate and to share in the 
assets. 
[9] rd.-Composition and Discharge-Debts not Affected-Par-
ticipation as Affecting Codebtor.-The fact that a creditor 
participated in a bankruptcy proceeding of one joint debtor 
despite a defective notice does not discharge his codebtor ai:S 
to whom a separate proceeding was instituted. The detailed 
scheduling of the debt and the one bankrupt's testimony 
thereof at the first creditors' meeting does not constitute a 
sufficient claim in the other proceeding. 
[10] Id.-Debts-Claims Provable-Time for-Extension-Duty 
to Petition for Leave.-Information. supplied by a bankrupt 
may be considered a claim only fOor the purpose of allowing 
a petitioning creditor to file an amended claim after the 
statutory period has expired, when equity and good conscience 
require that he be permitted to participate in the bankruptcy 
proceeding. _ The creditor is not required to petition for leave 
to file such an amended claim. 
[11] Executions-Relief Against---Quashing-Costs.-Since a mo·· 
tion to quash a writ of execution is a special proceeding (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 23), costs must be allowed the prevailing party. 
(See Code Civ. Proc., § 1032 (a).) 
[12] Decedents' Estates-Actions-Costs.-Costs adjudged on a 
proceeding to quash a writ of execution in an action by an 
administrator are chargeable against the estate, and not the 
administrator personally, where there is no claim of mis-
management or bad faith. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1026.) 
APPEAl.J from· an order and judgment of the Superior 
Court of Los Angeles County recalling a writ of execution, 
directing release of property held under the writ, and enjoin-
ing the securing of a further writ or enforcing the judgment 
against the defendants. Charles D. Ballard, Judge. Af-
firmed in part and reversed in part. 
Oscar S. Elvrum and Girard F. Baker for Appellant. 
Otto A. Gerth for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On August 15, 1935, plaintiff Harry G. 
Van Denburgh, as administrator of the estate of Mrs. Ar-
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thur J. Clark, obtained a judgment against defendants 
Walter V. Goodfellow and Elizabeth B. Goodfellow, upon a 
note secured by a mortgage. On September 10, 1935, the 
mortgaged premises were sold and a deficiency judgment was 
entered against the defendants. On September 23, 1936, 
the defendants filed separate petitions in bankruptcy in the 
Federal District Court, and each was adjudicated a bankrupt. 
They listed plaintiff's judgment in the schedule of debts 
attached to each bankruptcy petition. Under the caption 
"Creditors Whose Claims Are Unsecured" there was listed: 
"Harry G. Van Denburgh, Admr. of Estate of Mrs. Ar-
thur J. Clark, deficiency on foreclosure judgment and sale 
. . . $20,000.00." The same indebtedness was also list~d in 
each petition under the caption "Creditors Holding SMuri-
ties" as follows: "Mrs. Arthur J. Clark, deceased, ca)"e of 
Harry G. Van Denburgh, 10] ° Title Guarantee Buil(ting, 
Los Angeles . . . $26,000.00." Full information about the 
indebtedness was given by defendants in their schedules as 
well as at the first meeting of the creditors. Harry G. Van 
Denburgh neither resided nor had an office at 1010 Title 
Guarantee Building. His name and proper address appeared 
in the Los Angeles telephone book and the city directory. 
Van Denburgh's attorneys in the matter of the estate of 
Mrs. Clark, whose names did not appear in defendant's sched-
ules, had offices on the tenth floor of the Title Guarantee 
Building in Los Angeles but not in room 1010. A copy CL 
plaintiff's complaint, served upon defendants, gave the office 
address of plaintiff's attorneys as 1019 Title Guarantee 
Building, but defendants read this address as 1010 Title 
Guarantee Building because the figures were blurred. 
A referee was appointed by the bankruptcy court and the 
first meeting' of creditors was held on October 13, 1936. No-
tice of this meeting was published in· the Los Angeles Daily 
Journal, but the notices intended for plaintiff Van Denburgh 
and mailed to the address given in the schedules were re-
turned undelivered. In October, 1936, a clerk of the trustee 
in bankruptcy telephoned the office of plaintiff's attorneys to 
inquire about possible assets in their possession belonging to 
the bankrupts' estates. The clerk, however, did not talk to 
the attorneys; the person answering the telephone informed 
him that the attorney for whom he asked was no longer as-
sociated with the office. Plaintiff received notice of defend-
Dec. 1941.] VAN DE~BURGH V. GOODFELLOW. 221 
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ants' bankruptcy proceedings on April 8, 1937. On May 24, 
1937, plaintiff petitioned the referee in the Walter V. Good-
fellow bankruptcy proceeding for leave to file a claim based 
on the deficiency judgment, and received permission to do 
so. No claim was filed in the Elizabeth B. Goodfellow bank-
ruptcy proceeding. Plaintiff shared in the subsequent dis-
'tribution of Walter V. Goodfellow's assets. 
On May 3, 1937, plaintiff secured a writ of execution and 
levied upon property of Walter V. Goodfellow. Defendants 
thereupon moved to quash the execution· and to restrain fu-
ture executions upon the ground they were released from the 
indebtedness to plaintiff by t~e adjudications of bankruptcy . 
After each defendant had received a final discharge in bank-
ruptcy on June 7, 1937, the superior court held a hearing, 
entered an order granting the motion, and gave judgment 
quashing the execution, enjoining plaintiff from securing 
any further writs of execution or attempting to enforce the 
judgment against defendants, and awarding costs to de-
fendants. The trial court found that defendants had no in-
tent to deceive the plaintiff and that "the plaintiff's name, 
claims and demands and description thereof, together with 
his address were properly and duly given and set forth by 
each of the defendants herein in their bankruptcy schedules 
... and that the plaintiff received actual notice of the filing 
of said bankruptcy petition and the pendency thereof of 
each of the defendants herein within the time prescribed by 
law for creditors to present and file their claims .... " 
Plaintiff has appealed from the order and judgment, con-
tending that the debt was not discharged by the bankruptcy 
proceedings because it was not properly listed by the defend-
ants in their bankruptcy schedules and because he did not 
receive notice of such proceedings within the time prescribed 
by the Bankruptcy Act. 
Section 25(8) (11 U. S. C. A., Sec. 25 (8)) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act requires a voluntary bankrupt to file with his 
petition "a list of his creditors, showing their residences, 
if known, if unknown, that fact to be stated." The penalty 
for failure to schedule a debt properly is stated in section 
35 of the act: "A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a 
bankrupt from all of his provable debts, except such as . . . 
have not been duly scheduled in time for proof and allow-
ance, with the name of the creditor, if known to the bankrupt, 
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unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the 
proceedings in bankruptcy ... " 
[1] It is well settled that a debt is not duly scheduled if 
the bankrupt has listed the creditor's address incorrectly. 
(See cases cited under 11 U. S. O. A., sec. 25, note 23; Brown 
v. Tropp, 106 Cal. App. 605 [289 Pac. 648]; Parker v. 
Murphy, 215 Mass. 72 [102 N. E. 85, 87] ; In Re D'Alessio, 
24 Fed. Supp. 563.) "The bankrupt is under duty to use 
reasonable diligence to ascertain the residence of the creditor, 
and if thereby he acquires knowledge of such residence he 
must state it correctly, and if he fails to ascertain such resi-
dence, to state that the residence is unknown. It is ... im-
plicit in a schedule which fails to state that the creditor's 
residence is unknown, that the bankrupt (after reasonably 
diligent inquiry, if necessary) knows such residence and has 
truly stated same." (McGehee v. Brookins (Tex. Oiv. App.), 
140 S. W. (2d) 963, 964.) 
[2] In the present case there is no evidence to support 
the finding of the trial court that plaintiff's address was 
properly set forth in defendants' bankruptcy schedules. The 
evidence establishes without contradiction that 1010 Title 
Guarantee Building was not the address of plaintiff, or of 
the estate of Mrs. Olark; or of plaintiff's attorneys. Since 
defendants could easily have determined plaintiff's correct 
address, their good faith in listing the debt is immaterial. 
(See Fible v. Orabb, 129 Ky. 461 [112 S. W. 576].) 
[3] There is likewise no evidence to support the finding 
of the trial court that plaintiff received notice of the bank-
ruptcy proceedings within the time prescribed by law for 
the filing of claims. Under the provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Act in force at that time a creditor's claim could not be al-
lowed unless it was filed within six months after the date on 
which the debtor was adjudicated a bankrupt. (44 Stats. 
(part 2) 666, c. 406, sec. 13.) The evidence shows that plain-
tiff received no notice of the bankruptcy proceedings until 
April 8, 1937, more than six months after September 23, 
1936, when defendants were adjudicated bankrupts. The 
notices mailed to the plaintiff by the referee were returned 
undelivered. No information was communicated to plaintiff 
or his attorneys by virtue of the telephone call of the trustee's 
clerk. Publication of a notice of the proceedings in the Los 
Angeles Daily Journal was not sufficient because the act 
Dec. 1941. ] VAN DENBURGH V. GOODFELLOW. 
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requires that actual notice be given to creditors. (Santa 
Rosa Bank v. White, 139 Cal. 703, 705 [73 Pac. 577] ; Rags-
dale v. Bothman, 81 Mont. 408 '[263 Pac. 972] ; Strickland 
v. Oapital Oity Mills, 74 S. O. 16 [54 S. E. 220, 7L. R. A. 
(N. S.) 426] ; Lynch v. McKee (Tex. Civ. App.), 214 S. W. 
484; Interstate Oredit League v. Widdison, 50 Ida. 493 [297 
Pac. 1106].) . 
[4] A bankruptcy referee, however, may in his discretion 
permit a creditor to file a formal claim after the six-month 
period has elapsed, under the theory that the formal claim 
is merely an amendment to an informal claim made within 
the time limit. (In re Lipman, 65 Fed. (2d) 366; In re 
Pant, 21 Fed. (2d) 182; Scottsville National Bank v. Gilmer, 
37 Fed. (2d) 227.) [5] Defendants contend, therefore, 
that the notice to plaintiff on April 8, 1937, was within the 
time prescribed by law for the filing of claims, since plain-
tiff was permitted to file his formal claim in the Walter V. 
Goodfellow bankruptcy proceeding more than six: months 
after the adjudication. It is established, however, that the 
notice required by the Bankruptcy Act must be given within 
the six-month period allowed by the act for the filing of 
claims. (Industrial Loan & Investment 00. v. Ohapman 
(La. App.), 193 So. 504; Bell v. Georgia Ohemical Works} 
33 Ga. App. 286 [125 S. E. 871]; Morganstern v. Tulchin, 
]40 Misc. 44 [250 N. Y. Supp. 498] ; In re :w eUe, 12 Fed. 
Supp. 612; Hunter v. Hall, 60 Ga. App. 493 [4 S. E. (2d) 
69] ; see In re Feldesman, 13 Fed. Supp. 1010; In re R. B. 
Rose 00., 43 Fed. (2d) 446; Brown v.· Tropp, supra.) 
[6] Moreover, the creditor must receive such notice in time 
to enable him to take advantage of the benefits of the Bank-
ruptcy Law "in time to give him an equal opportunity with 
other creditors." It may not come so late "as to deprive 
him of participation in the administration of the affairs of 
the estate .... " (Birkett v. Oolumbia Bank, 195 U. S. 
345 [25 Sup. Ct. 38, 49 L. Ed. 231] ; Brown v. Tropp) supra; 
Reynolds v. Whittemore, 99 Me. 108 [58 Atl. 415].) The 
creditor's right to participate in the administration of the 
affairs of the estate, including the right to vote for the trus-
tee, cannot be disregarded on the theory that such participa-
tion would have made no difference. (Brown v. Tropp, 
supra.) 
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Clearly the defendants did not properly state plaintiff's 
address in their bankruptcy schedules nor did plaintiff re-
ceive notice in time to render the error of no consequence~ 
In the absence of further action on plaintiff's part, the dis-
charge of each defendant in bankruptcy would not release 
his debt. 
[7a] In the Walter V. Goodfellow proceeding the referee 
permitted the plaintiff to file a formal claim, after the ex-
piration of the six-month period, on the theory that it was 
an amendment to the claim shown to exist by the schedules 
of the bankrupt and his testimony at the first meeting of 
the creditors. On the basis of this claim the plaintiff shared 
in the bankrupt's estate. This voluntary participation by 
plaintiff in the. bankruptcy proceeding operates to discharge 
the debt owed him by the bankrupt, despite the incorrect 
address and' the late notice. It is true that certain types 
of debts for reasons of public policy, cannot be discharged 
by bankruptcy proceedings, and a creditor who files a claim 
and shares in the assets is not barred from subsequently en-
forcing the unsatisfied portion of the debt. (Friend v . . Tal-
cott, 228 U. S. 27 [33 Sup. Ct. 505, 57 L. Ed. 718] ; Allard 
v. La Plain, 147 Wash. 497 [266 Pac. 688]. See Meyer v. 
Price, 250 N. Y. 370 [165 N. E. 814].) Such debts, listed 
in section 35 of the Bankruptcy Act, include liabilities for 
obtaining property by false pretenses or misrepresentations, 
for wilful and malicious injuries to person or property, for 
alimony or maintenance of wife or child, for seduction, for 
fraud, embezzlement, or misappropriation while acting in a 
fiduciary capacity, and taxes. A debt that is not discharged 
only because it is improperly scheduled, however, does not 
fall into this category for there is nothing in the nature of 
such a debt that requires a denial of discharge. (See In 
re Baker, 275 Fed. 511, 512.) [8] The provisions requiring 
either a correct statement of the creditor's address or actual 
notice to him are intended to insure the creditor an oppor-
tunity to participate in the administration of the bankrupt's 
estate and to share in the assets. [7b] A creditor who re-
frains from making a claim against the bankrupt when these 
provisions are violated does not share in the assets of the es-
. tate but retains his debt unimpaired. If, on the contrary, he 
elects to file a claim with the permission of the referee: he 
waives any rights arising from defects in the schedule or 
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notice or from any detriment he may suffer because of having 
no opportunity to participate in the administration of the 
estate and receives in return the right to share in the distri-
bution of assets. The principal right of a creditor in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding, to which all other rights are incidental, 
is sharing in the assets. If a .creditor such as the plaintiff 
in the present case elects to share in the assets, there is rio 
reason why his debt should not be discharged. 
[9] Plaintiff, however, did not file a claim in the Eliza-
beth B. Goodfellow bankruptcy proceeding and the debtor 
there remains liable on the debt. That liability is in no 
way altered by plaintiff's claim in the Walter V. Goodfell ow 
proceeding. The two proceedings were separate and the dis-
charge of Walter V. Goodfellow did not· discharge his co-
debtor. (Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. A., sec. 34; "Wilcox 
v. Hersch, 43 R. 1. 81 [110 Atl. 409]; Barnes v. Silveus, 
114 Pa. Super. 214 [173 Atl. 837] ; In re Quackenb'UJsh, 106 
N. Y. Supp. 773. See cases cited in 11 U. S. C. A., sec. 34, 
. notes 21, 22.) Defendants contend that if the detailed sched-
uling of plaintiff's debt and the bankrupt's extensive testi-
mony thereon at the first creditors' meeting constituted a 
claim in the Walter V. Goodfellow proceeding, they must 
also constitute a sufficient claim in the Elizabeth B. Good-
fello·w bankruptcy proceeding. This contention fails to take 
account of the requirement in the Bankruptcy Act that the 
creditor must make proof of his claim. (11 U. S. C. A., 
sec. 93.) [10] Information supplied by a bankrupt may be 
considered a claim only for the purpose of allowing a peti-
tioning creditor to file an amended claim after the statutory 
period has expired, when equity and good 'conscience require 
that he be permitted to participate in the bankrupt'cy proceed.,. 
ings. There is nothing in the Bankruptcy Act that requires 
the creditor to petition for leave to file such an amended 
claim. (Brown v. Tropp, supra; Birkett v. Columbia Bank, 
supr~.) 
[11] Since the motion by defendants to quash the execu-
tion is a special proceeding (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 23; Murphy 
v. Davids, 55 Cal. App. 416, 420, 421 [203 Pac. 802]; see 
In re Sutter Butte By-Pass Assessment, 190 Cal. 532, 537 
[213 Pac. 974]), costs must be allowed the prevailing party. 
(Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1032 (a).) Defendants contend that 
the costs awarded them by the trial court were chargeable 
19 c. (2d)-'S 
226 BLACKBURN V. HOME LIFE INS. Co. [19 C. (2d) 
against plaintiff personally, and are not reviewable on appeal 
because plaintiff personally has not appealed. [12] There 
is no charge of mismanagement or bad faith on the part of 
plaintiff, however, so costs are chargeable against the estate of 
Mrs. Clark, not against plaintiff personally, and the judg-
ment should so state. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1026; Sterling 
v. Gregory, 149 Cal. 117,121,122 [85 Pac. 305].) 
The order and judgment are affirmed insofar as they apply 
to Walter V. Goodfellow, and are reversed insofar as they 
apply to Elizabeth B. Goodfellow. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and 
Carter, J., concurred. 
[L. A. No. 17495. In Bank. Dec. 22, 1941.] 
HOWARD W. BLACKBURN, Appellant, v. HOME LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK (a Cor-
poration) , Respondent. 
[1] Insurance-Contract - Interpretation-Against Insurer .-Be-
cause contracts of insurance are generally drawn by the in-
surer, any uncertainties or ambiguities therein are resolved 
most strongly in favor of the insured. 
[2] Id.-Contract-Interpretation-Application of General Rules. 
Where there is no ambiguity in a contract of insurance, courts 
will indulge in no forced construction againt the insul'er, 
and the policy, like any other contract, is to be interpreted 
according to the intention of the parties as expressed in the 
instrument in the light of the surrounding circumstances. 
[3] Id.-Contract - Interpretation - Indorsements and Riders-
Single Contract.-Where a life insurance policy, with an at-
tached rider covering disability benefits, was issued pursuant 
to a single application for a policy of life insurance "with" 
disability benefits, where it describes itself as one policy, and 
where the rider standing alone is incomplete and meaning-
[1] See 14 Cal. Jur. 443-445; 29 Am. Jur. 166. 
[2] See 14 Cal. Jur. 446; 29 Am. Jur. 172. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Insurance, § 60; [2] Insurance, 
§ 56; [3-5] Insurance, § 67. 
Dec. 1941.] BLACKBURN V. HOME LIFE INS. Co. 
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less, the policy and its rider constitute a single unified 
contract. 
[4] Id.-Contract - Interpretation - Indorsements and Riders-
Separate Contract-Title.-The controlling effect of decisions 
determining to be single contracts policies with attached riders 
entitled "Supplementary Agreement made a part of the Pol-
icy," is not avoided by the change of the title to read, contract 
"issued in connection with and attached to Policy," espe-
cially where the law of the place of contract expressly 
provides that rider forms shall be deemed to be parts of 
policies. 
[5] Id.-Cont1;act - Interpretation - Indorsements and Riders-
Separate Contract-Particular Circumstances.-In determin-
ing whether a rider providing for disability benefits consti-
tutes a contract separate from the policy to which it is 
attached,controlling significance is not to be attached to the 
fact that it was separately executed, that its premium is 
separately stated and not combined with that of the policy, 
or that the benefits provideq. for may be discontinued by the 
policy holder without terminating the benefit provisions of the 
policy. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Minor l\{oore, Judge. Affirmed. 
Representative action by holder of policy of mutual insur-
ance company for an accounting, for judgment for dividends 
claimed to be due policyholders, and a declaration of the 
rights of the respective parties. Judgment for defendant 
affirmed. 
Arthur Rosenblum and -Fred Horowitz for Appellant 
Loeb & Loeb, Herman F. Selvin and William Marshall 
Bullitt for Respondent. 
EDMONDS, J.-The allegations of the appellant's com-
.plaint include the statement that he is suing on behalf of 
himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated holding 
policies issued by the respondent which provide for payment 
upon death and also for permanent disability benefits. He 
charges that the respondent has been guilty of unlawful dis-
crimination by calculating and allowing dividends Upon such 
policies at a lower rate than upon those which do not include 
disability benefits. Because of the respondent's practice in 
